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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
by
Jobn H. McElhaney*

M

ORE than four hundred and fifty appellate opinions involving procedure during the survey period' are distilled into the following
discussion of selected cases.
Jurisdiction over the Person. The federal courts, when required to make
an Erie pronouncement on Texas long arm law, continue to construe article
2031b' as broadly as the constitutional standard of "minimum contacts"
will allow.' However, the state decisions seldom raise the constitutional
issues, and usually turn upon the mechanics of pleading the long arm jurisdictional allegations.
For example, the plaintiff's failure to plead jurisdictional allegations substantially tracking the language of article 2031b results in a judgment,
which if rendered by default, is vulnerable to a successful attack by writ
of error to the court of civil appeals." In the same technical' vein, a court
of civil appeals6 has held that section 3 of article 203 1b may be used to
confer in personam jurisdiction only if section 6' does not fit the facts of
the case. Likewise, purported in personam service under rule 108" is not
sufficient to withstand a special appearance even though the facts of the
case might have authorized service under section 2 of article 203 lb.
The supreme court has not yet decided the question, but apparently the
burden of proof upon jurisdictional facts is upon a specially appearing defendant, rather than upon the plaintiff." A court of civil appeals decision
holds that a special appearance is a form of plea in abatement, and as such
the burden of proof and persuasion is upon the defendant." That same
*B.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Lecturer, Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
'Volumes 431 through 442 South Western Reporter, Second Series.
2TEx.

REV. CIr. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).

'Barnes
v. Irving Trust Co., 290 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
4
Two civil appeals decisions, Curry v. Dell Publishing Co., 438 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e., and Harris v. Hayles, 433 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1968), so held, following McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).
a In this sense a "technicality" is a settled rule of law which is unknown to counsel until successfully invoked against his client.
'Collins v. Mize, 436 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968), rev'd, 447 S.W.2d 674
(Tex. 1969).
'TEx.
REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (1964) provides for substituted service in the
event the non-resident does not maintain an agent for service. It is, therefore, necessary to allege
the failure to maintain an agent in order to use S 3. Id. S 6 provides for substituted service when
a former resident leaves the state when the defendant is not required to appoint an agent for service.
8 TEx. R. Crv. P. 108 does not actually authorize or confer pure in personam jurisdiction. See
Bonanza, Inc. v. Lee, 337 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960).
9 American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers v. Hawk, 436 S.W.2d 3 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1969).
1"Tx. R. Crv. P. 120a. This rule was suggested in the early stages of the Texas special appearance practice in Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; art. 2031b, The Texas 'Long Arm' Jurisdiction
Statute; and the Appearance To Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAs L. REv.
279 (1964).
11Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d 59f (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968).
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case also holds that there is no right to a jury trial upon the jurisdictional
facts.
A Mexican divorce, granted without actual notice under circumstances
when actual notice was possible, was held to be void." When citation is by
publication, it is not an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial even
though the defendant may have a copy of the pleadings in a divorce suit."
In Fitch v. Jones4 no clear distinction was made between subject matter
and in personam jurisdiction. A bankrupt made a special appearance under
rule 120a" in a state court suit, claiming prior exclusive jurisdiction in the
bankruptcy court. The Texas supreme court held that a state court suit
involving the affairs of a bankrupt may be subject to abatement during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. If the state suit is not disposed of in the bankruptcy proceeding, it may be prosecuted in the state
court after the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding, notwithstanding
the special appearance.
In Ex parte Herring," a child support-contempt proceeding, the supreme
court held that personal service upon the defendant, rather than notice by
registered mail to his attorney under rule 21a," is required to meet due
process notice requirements absent a showing that the defendant was avoiding service of process. Normally, of course, notice of hearings solely to an
attorney during the ordinary course of litigation would comply with due
process requirements, the principal issues being the existence and duration
of the attorney's agency. Here, there was no discussion or proof of a continuing attorney-client relationship. Neither was there a showing of the

defendant's knowledge of the pendency of the proceeding.
Default Judgments and Bills of Review.

In a case of first impression, the

Texas supreme court in Texas Machinery L Equipment Co. v. Gordon

Knox Oil & Exploration Co." held that a default judgment against a
garnishee, who did not have any property belonging to the debtor, could
not be set aside on the theory that a garnishment proceeding does not have

all of the attributes of a full adversary proceeding. The defaulting garnishee
sought relief by way of a bill of review, but could not meet the strict

requirements of Alexander v. Hagedorn" which ordinarily apply. A strong
dissent argued that the ordinary bill of review requirements should be
relaxed in a garnishment situation because garnishment is inquisitorial
rather than fully adversary in nature." However, this view would have
" Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
"aFlowers v. Flowers, 433 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968), error ref. n.r.e.

14441 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1969).

"s TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a.
"6438 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1969).
"7TEx. R. Crv. P. 21a.
'8442 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1969).
9 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950). To set aside a judgment under a bill of review the
party must allege and prove: "(1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support
the judgment, (2) which he was prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act
of the opposite party, (3) unmixed with any negligence of his own." Id. at 568-69, 226 S.W.2d
at 998.
20 Id. at 576, 226 S.W.2d at 1002.
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been inconsistent with the strong policy favoring the finality of judgments
which underlies the bill of review practice.
In Finlay v. Jones"' the Texas supreme court held that the necessity of
compliance with the requirements of a bill of review could not be avoided
through the device of a nunc pro tunc order granting a new trial after
expiration of the thirty-day time limit on the trial court's power to set
aside the judgment except by bill of review.
Although it is improper to grant a summary judgment only nine days
after the supporting motion is filed, Callaway v. Elliott' held this irregularity could be raised in a conventional appeal and does not make the judgment vulnerable to attack through a bill of review. When the right to
prosecute a conventional appeal is lost through the failure to file a motion

for new trial, the defendant is not entitled to maintain a bill of review.'
Likewise, any error in a judgment rendered after the appearance and withdrawal of the defendant's attorney can be corrected by a conventional
appeal, and the defendant is precluded from equitable relief by way of a
bill of review.'
In two similar opinions, the excuse of an attorney that he was not
given adequate notice of a setting was unavailable in a motion for new
trial to set aside a default judgment," and the erroneous informal advice
of a court bailiff to the defendant's attorney that the case would not be
tried was not a ground for a new trial." Probably the year's most frivolous
unsuccessful excuse for non-appearance was the claim of a defendant,
who had been represented by a succession of lawyers, that he was unable
to attend the trial because of a rash caused by his nervousness about not
having an attorney." Contrasting favorable treatment was given to the
excuse of an attorney who did not appear because he was engaged in conversation with another judge. 8
Despite actual knowledge of the rendition of a default judgment gained
by receipt of a copy of the judgment through the clerk's compliance with
rule 239a,2 the defaulting defendant is entitled to appeal by writ of error
to the court of civil appeals, raising errors apparent upon the face of the
record.' The court held that such an error was present when the sheriff's

return of citation did not affirmatively show the "manner of service" as
required by rule 107.3'
On a de novo appeal from a justice court judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant still occupies the position of a defendant on appeal
21435 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1969).

S.W.2d
Washington
1968), error ref.
24 Ziebarth v.
22440
2

99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969), error dismissed.
v. Golden State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 436 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
n.r.e.
Lee & Beulah Moor Children's Home, 431 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso

1968).5

2 Bland v. Bland, 437 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969).
"6Combs v. Combs, 435 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
"7 Cate v. Beene, 440 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), error ref.
"9 Drennan v. Belgin Enterprises, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968).
2 TEX. R. Crv. P. 239a.
"' Diamond Chem. Co. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 437 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi

1968).
" TEX. R. CIv. P. 107.
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in the county court, and as such is not entitled to take a default judgment."
A default judgment rendered in a suit brought to try the right to property
was held to be void and properly set aside by the trial court. It had been
rendered in violation of the particular rules" applicable in such suits which
require the trial court to order the issues joined before the trial proceeds."
Parties. In Thoreson v. Thompson' the Texas supreme court held that
the plaintiff's insurer is a necessary party where the insurer is subrogated
to some portion of recovery. The court did not discuss the question as to
whether it would be proper for the defendant to make this fact known
to the jury. Although the insurer was held to be a "necessary" party the
court gave no indication whether it considers the subrogated insurer an
"indispensable" party, the absence of which would constitute fundamental

error within the rule of Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra.'
However, in another case, where the record reflected the participation of
the subrogated insurance carrier in the trial, a court of civil appeals held
that the defendant is not exposed to further liability and it is not necessary
to name the insurer in the judgment."
A civil appeals decision held that a church, which was a residuary legatee
under a will, was an indispensable party in a suit to construe the will; its
absence constituted fundamental error noticed upon the court's own motion.' This same rule was applied to the failure to join the plaintiff's

credit union in a suit to rescind the sale of a mobile home.39
The Texas supreme court has held that the absence of a plea in abatement prevents reversal when a widow has sued individually rather than as
administratrix to recover real property in behalf of an estate.'
An unincorporated civil club which maintains, but does not own, the
street entrance markers of a real estate subdivision, does not have a

sufficient justiciable interest to maintain a damage suit for destruction of
the markers."
Pleadings. Texas pleading becomes increasingly intricate, and more chockfull of rules and exceptions to rules with each addition to the constantly
increasing, and sometimes conflicting, body of case law. The critical fears

of those who seemed disappointed with the Texas failure to adopt fully the
federal pleading rules' now seem prophetic. One court of civil appeals
"Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Hicks, 439 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
"TEx. R. Civ. P. 717-36.
"Davis v. Howard, 436 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968).
"5431 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1968).
'36406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966).
7
" Seamless Floors by Ford, Inc. v. Value Line Homes, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"Kelsey v. Hill, 433 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968).
39Crabtree v. Burkett, 433 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968).
40Coakley v. Reising, 436 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1969).
"'Reed v. Tanglewilde Civic Club, 431 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error

ref. n.r.c.
", E.g., Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 TEXAs L. REv. 4 (1941).
The Texas pleading practice is certainly more complicated than the federal practice in which, for
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held a general allegation of negligence to be insufficient to support a default judgment" while another recognized the rule that a petition which
does not state a cause of action will nevertheless support a default judgment." The specific conditions giving rise to a plea of unavoidable accident
must be pleaded.' One court held that an oral motion for continuance was
properly denied because the party did not ask leave subsequently to reduce
the motion to writing," while another court held that an oral amended
pleading was properly considered when the trial court granted permission
to later reduce it to writing. 7
When a special exception to the opponent's pleading is sustained, the
opponent, in the absence of an amendment, is left without any pleading
on that matter," but in that state of the record the issue still might be tried
by implied consent." One nonritualistic opinion held that a party's prior
actual knowledge of the facts he attempts to extract from his adversary
by exceptions asking for more detailed pleading should be taken into
account in determining whether harmful error has resulted if the trial
court technically errs in failing to require those facts to be more specifically
pleaded.'"
Rule 94"5 expressly includes the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense which must be affirmatively pleaded. In First National Bank v.
Zimmermansa the supreme court disapproved prior opinions to the contrary,
and following the express requirement of rule 94, held that an objection
to evidence based upon the statute of frauds will not suffice without an
affirmative pleading of that defense. Civil appeals decisions reminded practitioners that judicial estoppel," waivers forgery,"5 and the contention that
the plaintiff is attempting to recover a contractual penalty rather than
liquidated damages ' are all affirmative defenses which must be pleaded.
example, official form 9 governs negligence pleading without requiring pleading of details such as
the specific acts of negligence. "There is no more need or purpose in supplementing form 9 by details
of the negligent act, for example, than there would have been in making such a supplement to the
old writ of trespass on the case, approved by Chitty, on which the form is directly patterned."
W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1721, at 188 (1958).
4"Stinson v. Jones, 434 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968). Despite this opinion,
TEx. R. Civ. P. 45(b) expressly sanctions the pleading of legal conclusions.
"Chokas v. Donald, 439 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969). This opinion correctly follows supreme court authority. Edwards Feed Mill v. Johnson, 158 Tex. 313, 311 S.W.2d
232 (1958).
5Mason v. Ratcliff, 437 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
Inc. v. Texas Warehouse Co., 437 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
"Sealite
47
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Gage, 438 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969),
error ref. m.r.e.
" Houser v. Sunshine Laundries & Dry Cleaning Corp., 438 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"' Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. McCool, 441 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
50 Lynch v. Southern Coast Drilling Co., 442 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
" TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
a' 4 4 2 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1969).
5
"Burket v. Delaware Drilling Corp., 435 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1968), error
dismissed.
54
Seamless Floors by Ford, Inc. v. Value Line Homes, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e
" Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Electrical Supply Corp., 434 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968), error ref. n.r.e.
56Young v. Zimmerman, 434 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), error dismissed.
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However, the denial of the alleged agency of an employee requires neither
affirmative pleading nor verification."
An attorney for a party may make an affidavit for his client under rule
14," but the affidavit must contain a recitation that the attorney had
authority to make it." A court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff's
prayer for general relief in an usury case did not expand the theory of
recovery stated in the body of the petition to allow recovery for both
penalty and interest." In contrast to this holding, the supreme court approved a court of civil appeals opinion which held the prayer for general
relief in the exception to a condemnation award was sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff to recover interest on judgment excess." The opinion makes
no reference to any pleading, other than the prayer, which would support
the recovery.
There is an important, but sometimes forgotten, distinction between the
uses for a plea in abatement and a motion for summary judgment when
the defendant contends that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under
the facts stated in his pleadings. In Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation"
the supreme court held that the defendant's plea in abatement addressed
itself only to the question of whether the plaintiff had standing to sue,
and not to the merits. The court concluded that since the trial court had
sustained the plea in abatement before purporting to render summary
judgment against the defendant, the summary judgment was meaningless,
and that only the plea in abatement was before the supreme court for
review.
In Akers v. Simpson' the supreme court held that rule 97(a)," the
compulsory counterclaim rule, cut off the right of James Akers, one of
two co-defendants, to prosecute his own separate personal injury suit
against the plaintiff in the original suit, after the entry of an agreed judgment in the original suit. Akers was never served with citation and never
knew of the fact that he was named as a defendant in the original suit.
His defense was conducted by an attorney employed by the other defendant's liability insurance carrier. However, the judgment in the original suit
recited the appearance of Akers, precluding a collateral attack upon that
judgment in the second suit. The only remedy for a party in this predicament is a direct attack, such as a bill of review, upon the original judgment.
In Hall v. Bleisch6' Bleisch and Hall had been co-defendants in a state
court suit arising out of an automobile accident. They had cross-claimed
against each other for indemnity, and that suit was terminated by the entry
of an agreed judgment. Bleisch then filed a federal diversity action against
57 Risinger v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 437 S.W.2d

'8 TEx. R. Civ. P. 14.

294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).

" Kern v. Treeline Golf Club, Inc., 433 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
"0Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), error
ref. n.r.e.
61 Trinity River Authority v. Sealy & Smith Foundation, 43 5 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1969), error ref.
62432 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968).
63445 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1969).
"'TEx. R. Cirv. P. 97(a).
65400 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Hall whose defense was that Bleisch's claim was a compulsory counterclaim
which was cut off by the entry of the prior judgment. The court distinguished a compulsory counterclaim from a cross-claim and held that
Bleisch's claim was not cut off. Rule 97 (a) is worded broadly enough to
make Bleisch's claim a compulsory counterclaim since it extends to any
claim the pleader has against "any opposing party." Co-defendants asserting
the right to indemnity against each other certainly seem to be "opposing
parties." However, rule 97 (e) provides for cross-claims and makes them
permissive rather than compulsory. The facts of Hall v. Bleisch expose a
conflict between the literal provisions of rules 97(a) and 97(e). Final
authoritative determination of this conflict will not be made until a Texas
state court rules on the matter.

Discovery. In Great American Insurance Co. v. Murray' the supreme
court ended any further doubt about discoverability of liability insurance
limits in Texas, holding them not discoverable. The opinion is a veritable
digest of the decisions permitting and prohibiting such discovery.
The supreme court has granted an application for writ of error in a
case in which a court of civil appeals held that opinion testimony of an
appraiser for the state is not immune from discovery in a condemnation
case.6" Rule 186a"' exempts from discovery information obtained in the
course of an investigation by a person employed to make an investigation,
but once that information is disclosed to, or obtained by, the adversary,
it is not immune from introduction into evidence."0 In camera inspection
of documents produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum, but claimed
to be privileged, was made by a trial court. The trial court concluded that
portions of the documents were privileged and placed them in a sealed
envelope without disclosing their contents to the party who requested the
subpoena. The court of civil appeals held that although rule 177a," which
provides for subpoenas duces tecum, does not require the party obtaining
the subpoena to make a showing of relevancy, such a requirement should
be engrafted upon the rule." There is ample authority for the in camera
inspection and the use of a sealed envelope to maintain secrecy until an
appellate ruling can be obtained, but a member of the court of civil appeals
separately deplored the use of in camera inspections which he views as
"destructive of the adversary system.""
Two civil appeals decisions upheld the trial court's exercise of discretion in striking pleadings, one of a defendant for refusing to appear
for an oral deposition' and the other in dismissing a workmen's compensa6

O TEx. R. Cirv. P. 97(e).
67437 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1969).
6" City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 434 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1968), error granted.
69
Tnx. R. Civ. P. 186a.
"'Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Gage, 438 S.W.2d 879, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969),
error ref. n.r.e.
7' TEx. R. Civ. P. 177a.
2
7 McGregor v. Gordon, 442 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
'lId. at 759.
74Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1968).
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tion suit when the plaintiff's doctor, upon the advice of the plaintiff's
attorney, refused to answer cross interrogatories propounded to him."5
Venue. Rule 840 provides that the special appearance and plea of privilege practices are still subject to the rules regarding due order of pleading.
A defendant who filed and presented a motion to quash "citation until the
defendant is properly named and before the Court" before pleading and
presenting its plea of privilege, was held to have waived its plea of privilege.77 Logically, a plea to the jurisdiction of the court should be considered
before venue matters. However, the motion to quash service only until the
defendant was properly named was held to be a plea in abatement rather
than a plea to the jurisdiction. Since it did not qualify as a special appearance, it amounted to a general appearance which waived the defendant's
venue rights.
Several cases dealt with the proper characterization of suits purporting to
deal with the title to land where the plaintiff was attempting to use subdivision 14T' which provides that such a suit must be brought in the county
in which the land is located. Normally the nature of the suit is determined
by the allegations in the petition."9 However, when the defendant admits
that he is not claiming title to the land, the plaintiff cannot obtain the
benefit of subdivision 14 merely by framing his pleadings as if title to
land were involved."' Where the supreme court had previously determined
that the plaintiff's cause of action was really for damages caused by a
wrongful conspiracy rather than for recovery of land, the plaintiff could
not use subdivision 14."1 A suit for specific performance of a contract to
convey title to land was held to be a suit which did not involve title to
land.8" A dissent logically argued that the claim could be characterized as
a suit for the recovery of land."
Unwitting waiver of venue rights can easily result in domestic relations
situations. These cases, which are too often continuing conflicts, are complicated by the fact that the supervision of child support payments always
remains in the same court which granted the divorce, despite subsequent
changes in residence by the parties." In one case," a defendant-former
wife was held to have waived her plea of privilege in the suit of her former
husband to change child custody because her plea of privilege was combined
with a petition asking for more child support and a review of her former
7 Willis v. Premier Ins. Co., 442 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
C TEx. R. Civ. P. 84.
"'Starr Gas Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., 436 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969),
error dismissed.
75
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 14 (1964).
" Fannin Bank v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error dismissed.
"Richter v. Plains Nat'l Bank, 440 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error
dismissed.
"Hunt Oil Co. v. Jones, 436 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968), error dismissed.
S"Hyder v. Kraft, 431 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), mandamus overruled.
83 Id. at 421.
"'Ex arte Goldsmith, 155 Tex. 605, 290 S.W.2d 502 (1956); Carlson v. Johnson, 327 S.W.2d
704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959).
' Nixon v. Rohrbach, 438 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
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husband's visitation privileges. Another former wife obtained a severance
of her former husband's counterclaim for custody which he filed following
a contempt motion against him." A severed counterclaim was subject to a
proper plea of privilege since venue in custody-change suits follows the
residence of the defendant." This rule cannot be circumvented by obtaining an ex Parte order temporarily changing custody to the plaintiff as a
prelude to the contest on the permanent change."
In Lester v. Weddle"8 the supreme court sent the case back to the court
of civil appeals for a determination of a negligence question under subdivision 9a,"0 which specifically governs negligence actions, rather than accepting the opinion of the court of civil appeals, which discussed the case
in terms of trespass under subdivision 9."

By suing a local dealer along with the manufacturer or distributor of
an alleged defective product, a plaintiff may use subdivision 4 to subject
an out-of-county manufacturer or distributor to suit in the county where
the plaintiff and the local dealer live." This practice will probably be
followed frequently since the Restatement of Torts' extends strict liability
to dealers as well as to manufacturers.
The plaintiff's controverting affidavit may not be used to supplement
or replace deficient venue allegations in his petition defining the nature of
the suit." Neither may admissions in the defendant's pleadings be used for
this purpose.95 However, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to incorporate
his petition by reference in the controverting affidavit."
Although venue rights are valuable rights, overall judicial efficiency and
consistency of results are probably not well served by the usual rule that
venue of a third party action" or a cross-claim is determined without
reference to venue of the main action. An exception to that rule is recognized when a cross-claim or counterclaim is filed against an out-of-county
intervenor. Such a party occupies a position analogous to a plaintiff, who
waives his venue right by voluntarily subjecting himself to the jurisdiction
of the court."9
Two venue opinions during the survey period create at least a super88Hollingsworth

v. Hollingsworth, 441 S.W.2d 619

(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

1969). The

opinion does not disclose how the possibly tricky problem of when and how the motion for severance was presented. Would the filing of a motion to sever violate the concept of due order of pleading, waiving the plea of privilege?
7
: Lakey v. McCarroll, 134 Tex. 191, 134 S.W.2d 1016 (1940).
8'Calloway
v. Calloway, 442 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
89431 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1968).
9°TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 9a (1964).
" The court of civil appeals then said it had merely inadvertently substituted the term "tres-

pass" for "negligence." Lester v. Weddle, 433 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968).
2 Byrum v. Stacy, 432 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
"RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
4

" Groce v. Gulf Oil Corp., 439 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
5
Moody Day Co. v. Westview Nat'l Bank, 441 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969),
error dismissed.
88 Pitt Grill, Inc. v. Albert, 432 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968).
9 High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. City of Perryton, 434 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

1968).
8 Moody Day Co. v. Westview Nat'l Bank, 441
S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969),
error dismissed.
"'Campbell v. Galbreath, 441 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), error dismissed.
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ficial conflict. One holds that in order to sustain venue under subdivision
5,'° the written contract exception, it is necessary to prove the execution
of the written contract by the defendant.' The other opinion holds that
the contract need not be signed by both parties if it is signed by one and
accepted by the other by his acts, conduct or acquiescence in the terms of
the agreement. ' A check delivered in a county other than the residence of
the drawee bank is not a contract performable in the county of delivery"°
for purposes of subdivision 5.
A controverting affidavit need not mention the number of the subdivision of article 1995 which is being invoked, as long as sufficient facts are
stated to bring the plaintiff within the factual requirements of the subdivision relied upon.' 4
Special Issues. The Texas State Bar Committee on Substantive Law
Changes and Advancements conducted a poll of the Texas district judges
in December 1969, making an inquiry on certain tort subjects." 5 Although
procedural matters were not mentioned or inquired about, it seems significant that sixty per cent of the judges who volunteered additional comments
in response to the questionnaire, expressed a dissatisfaction with the present special issue system. These comments by two judges sum up the two

greatest areas of the present dissatisfaction:
1. Modify Special Issue submissions to point of submitting a general chargeJurors are usually aware of what they are actually doing and [it] would
be a more honest approach.
2. [Permit] some more liberalization in Special Issue submission-cutting
down on [the] number of Special Issues in line with common sense.
The two major areas of dissatisfaction do not necessarily mean that the

whole system should be abolished in a complete retreat to the general
charge. The federal practice, implemented by federal rule 49,'0 provides
a flexible and simple practice. There the desirability of obtaining jury
findings upon specific aspects of a suit is separated from the additional

entanglements which follow when the factual inquiries are so fragmented
that the jury is not supposed to be able to tell who will win the case.
Viewed from the perspective of the federal bench, the Texas system,

based upon the theory of keeping the jury from learning the effect of
its answers, is really a "trap" designed to "hoodwink" the jury and: "In
this day and time with advanced education and advocacy of such a highly
developed and demonstrative state, it is little short of insulting to the
jurors-more so to the lawyers and most of all to the Judges who report
'°°TFx.REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5 (1964).
...Pitt Grill, Inc. v. Albert, 432 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
'Pierce v. Pickett, 432 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
:03 Lawyers
Sur. Corp. v. Preston, 442 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
" Moss v. Loveless, 439 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969).

'0'
The questionnaire was primarily concerned with comparative vis-a-vis contributory negligence,
and the so-called "no fault" compensation plans such as the Keeton-O'Connell plan. The questionnaire did not call for the judge's signature and the source of the answers and the source of the
specific comments must, of course, be kept confidential.
'" FED. R. Crv. P. 49.
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such Shibboleths-to10 think that a juror will not have a good idea of the
effect of his answer. M
Fifth Circuit Chief Judge John R. Brown sees the real value of a special
interrogatory system "not to entrap nor even run out all of the inescapable
emotions by a sort of automatic dryer," but to have imperfect general verdicts from total invalidity. 8 when only a portion is erroneous.'" Despite
all this respectable judicial criticism, the Texas appellate courts continue
to write opinions adding rules, exceptions to rules, and new wrinkles to
old rules, in this already incredibly complicated body of law.
An issue asking if the plaintiff "either slowed or stopped her automobile
suddenly upon a public highway . ..when the same could not be done
with safety" was held to be reversibly erroneous because it combined two
inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff slowed or stopped, and (2) if the
slowing or stopping took place at a time when it could not be done with
safety." Another negligence decision held as erroneously duplicitous an
issue which inquired whether the operator of a train failed to blow its
whistle or give warning of the approaching train."' In a slip and fall case,
decided in a more liberal vein, the court held that an issue inquiring
whether the defendant "failed to remedy" the slick and slippery condition of an asphalt ramp was proper, and that it would have been improper further to fragment the issue into separate inquiries such as the
defendant's failure to apply carborundum strips, glue products, or other
remedies."' The harmless error rule applies to an erroneous submission of
multiple shades of the same inquiry."'
Decisions in non-negligence cases continue to allow a more liberal grouping of facts into a single issue. Issues were approved lumping all of the
elements of a common-law marriage into a single inquiry," ' and combining an inquiry which covered several banking transactions which took the
same form."' A court of civil appeals opinion preserves the almost essential
custom of making use of rule 272"' by orally dictating objections to the
charge to the court reporter with the agreement to reduce the objections to
writing later." ' One party claimed on appeal that he had not consented to
this customary procedure, as required by rule 272. However, the appellate
court held that the trial court's certificate that the objections had been
.. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 341 (1968).
1'"E.g., E.L. Cheeney Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965).
10 Brown, supra note 107, at 341. Judge Brown views the federal special interrogatory practice
as a "wonder to behold." Id. at 344.
11McNutt v. Quails, 433 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
"'Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969),

error2ref. nr.e.
1

H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Quick, 442 S.W.2d 798

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969),

error ref. ,,.r.e.
"'Shaw Tank Cleaning Co. v. Texas Pipeline Co., 442 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

1969).

114Mata

v. Rangel, 432 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e.

"' First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Northside State Bank, 436 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-

San Antonio 1969).
"0 TEx. R. CIrv. P. 272.
". Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error
ref. nr.e.
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dictated in compliance with rule 272 rendered the complaint unmeritorious.
The job of preparing a correct charge is not made any easier by two
logical but disquieting holdings which point out the fact that neither the
mere use of a special issue quoted in an appellate opinion in which the
trial court was affirmed,' nor the failure to follow the form of special
issues which were approved by supreme court Chief Justice Robert W.
Calvert, insure a litigant that the special issue will be given the same treatment in his own case. 1 ' Hopefully, the Texas State Bar's recent publication, "Texas Pattern Jury Charges," will go a long way toward alleviating
the anathema of the application of the Texas special issue system.
Collateral Estoppel. The Texas application of the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel is presently limited to cases in which there is an
identity of parties."' This limitation makes those doctrines inapplicable in
successive suits by victims of the same mass tort such as a train wreck or
a commercial airline crash. However, New York courts, which view the
Texas mutuality of parties rule as "anachronistic" have for now... decided
that a Texas judgment for the plaintiff in a wrongful death case arising
out of a Kentucky air disaster"a entitles New York domiciled plaintiffs to
summary judgment upon the issue of liability." Cogent policy arguments
can be made for the offensive use of collateral estoppel in mass torts.
Repeated trials for all claims resulting from a commercial airline crash are
an unthinkable luxury. Legal reasoning tied to the mutuality of parties
doctrine may not really be applicable when the defendant is the same common carrier. The new application of offensive collateral estoppel is now so
well entrenched in some jurisdictions, such as New York, that the old
mutuality rule has been declared to be a "dead letter."" However, serious
hypothetical problems can be posed: (1) What if the defendant wins the
first case? If so, are the unrepresented plaintiffs entitled to another chance?
(2) What if the first plaintiff loses but the second plaintiff wins? What
then happens to the following plaintiffs? What then happens to the unlucky first plaintiff? Despite such unanswered questions, it is respectfully
submitted that the Texas courts should take another look at Texas' "anachronistic" mutuality rule.
8
" State v. Tidwell, 435 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), error ref. n.r.e.

119Brock v. Underwood, 436 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
The requested issues appeared in Neal & Paddock, Submission of Issues in Uncontrolled-Intersection
Collision Cases in Texas, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1965), to which Justice Calvert wrote a recommendatory introduction.
...Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1964); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Southern Lumber
Co., 145 Tex. 151, 196 S.W.2d 387 (1946), in which at least privity to a party to the first litigation is required to take advantage of a former judgment.
15' The case to be discussed may be appealed.
""The Texas case, Creasy v. American Airlines, Inc., 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969), was tried

in a federal court on diversity of citizenship, but the New York courts have treated the collateral
problems as involving an application of Texas rather than federal procedural law.
estoppel
55
" Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1969). A previous New York

holding arising out of the same litigation refused to bestow the benefits of offensive collateral
estoppel upon non-New York domiciliary plaintiffs. Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 10 Av. Cas.
17,894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 297 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1969), noted in 68
COLuM.
L. REv. 1590 (1968); 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 289 (1969).
554
B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
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Summary Judgment. In two important decisions the supreme court has
clearly indicated that expert opinions, contained in affidavits or depositions,
are not sufficiently conclusive to support a summary judgment. In Snow
v. Bond," a malpractice case, the depositions and affidavits of disinterested
doctors, supporting the defendant, were held to be insufficient to warrant
affirmance of the summary judgment for the defendant because that testimony was stated in terms of a conclusion as to what a hypothetically
reasonably prudent doctor should do. In Broussard v.Moon'" uncontradicted expert testimony about what a reasonably prudent dishwasher repairman should do was held inconclusive under the rule that opinion
testimony does not establish any material fact as a matter of law.
A civil appeals case which did not involve expert testimony held that
interested but uncontradicted testimony may be considered in support of
a summary judgment, " but such testimony should not be considered unless
it is "positive," whatever that term may mean,"' Similarly, the fact that
a summary judgment deponent is related to a party may deprive his testimony of conclusive effect."u
Negligence cases are usually inappropriate for summary judgment since
the defendant has the negative burden of proving that the plaintiff has no
cause of action.1"
A practical problem in the trial courts is the frequency of attempts upon
the part of the non-moving party to file an affidavit on the day of the hearing. Rule 166-A (c) "' provides that opposing affidavits may be served prior
to the day of the hearing, but this provision has been applied to give the
trial court discretion to allow" or to disallow" affidavits tendered on the
day of the hearing. In the exercise of this discretion the trial court may
terminate discovery and refuse an application to take a deposition filed
on the day of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.'
A civil appeals opinion acknowledges, but fails to apply, subdivision (a)
of rule 166-A which expressly sanctions the rendition of a partial summary
judgment as to liability although a fact dispute may exist as to damages.
The court found a disputed fact only on the damage issue, but nevertheless
reversed and remanded the entire controversy, apparently misapplying the
general rule that partial remands are not sanctioned."'5 It is submitted that
in summary judgment situations the express approval of partial judgments
in rule 166-A (a) should have controlling application in both the trial and
appellate courts.
'2 438 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1969).

S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1968).
'"Benson v. Gunn & Briggs, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error
'2431

ref. n.r.e.
128T.J. Bettes Co. v. American Airco, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969);

Johnson v. Floyd West & Co., 437 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
l Lindley v, Transamerica Ins. Co., 437 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
0Scott v. T.G. & Y. Stores, 433 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
1
Tax. R. Crv. P. 166-A(c).
"sCity Nat'l Bank v. Bradshaw, 433 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968).
13. Kemp v. Harrison, 431 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
'"Traweek v. Radio Brady, Inc., 441 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), error
ref. n.r.e.

Waples-Platter Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 156 Tex. 234, 294 S.W.2d 375 (1956).
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Technical and mechanical matters of note are: A verified petition may
not be considered as summary judgment evidence." In the absence of an
exception in the trial court, uncertified copies of exhibits which have been
incorporated by reference from other pleadings may be considered."a ' Findings of fact have no place in a summary judgment record and are not
binding upon an appellate court."l An objection that an affidavit is not
based upon personal knowledge is waived if not presented in the trial
court.' A recitation in a summary judgment that it was rendered after
due notice is conclusive on appeal." The court may rule upon a motion for
summary judgment before the time has expired for the non-moving party
to file an amended pleading in response to the moving party's amended
pleading." 1 The absence of depositions filed in the trial court supporting
the motion for summary judgment is fatal on appeal.'"
Limitations. New article 5539c," effective September 1, 1969, extends
the statute of limitations for an additional thirty days on counterclaims and
cross-claims, which otherwise would have been cut off between answer date
and the time the original petition was filed. The statute changes the result
of cases such as Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis,'" which denied the right to
affirmative recovery upon such a counterclaim, and only allowed it to be
pleaded defensively to the extent that it defeated the plaintiff's right to
recovery. However, the protection of the statute extends only to counterclaims and cross-claims which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence upon which the plaintiff's suit is based.
Appellate Procedure. In City of Beaumont v. Graham'" the supreme
court reminded practitioners that rules 453 and 455'" only require the
written opinion of a court of civil appeals to state whether the factual
determinations in the trial court should be upheld and that it is a "grave
misconception" for attorneys to think that the opinion should make evidentiary findings. The courts of civil appeals have no jurisdiction to make
original findings of fact and they can only "unfind" facts.
A flexible and discretionary policy exists in both the supreme court and
the courts of civil appeals in determining whether to reverse and render or
to reverse and remand for a new trial when it is determined that there is
no evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. In National Life
& Accident Insurance Co. v. Blagg... the supreme court rendered judgment
rather than allowing another "bite at the apple" because the court con.. Marcus
7
13"Wexler
saCity of
laSims v.

v. Kinabrew, 438 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 439 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
Grand Prairie v. City of Irving, 441 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
Citizens State Bank, 434 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).

.'.Farmers
& Stockmens' Bank v. White, 434 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
41
1 L.A. Durrett & Co. v. lley,
434 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), 'error ref. n.r.e.
42
1 Rinker v. Ward, 440 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error rel. n.r.e.
'"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Supp. 1969).
'4 127 Tex. 41, 91 S.W.2d 313 (1936), criticized in 1 A.L.R.2d 703 (1948).
'4s 4 4 1 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1969).
146TEx. R. Civ. P. 453, 455.
147438 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1969).
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cluded that no new evidence would be available at another trial. However,

in Texas Sling Co. v. Emanuel'" and Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance
Co. v. Nichols, 4' the supreme court exercised its "wide discretion" by remanding for a new trial despite its finding that as a matter of law the
evidence would not support the judgment below. If the supreme court
remands a case to the court of civil appeals for additional factual determinations, neither party may assert new or additional points of error at that
stage of the proceedings." 0
Damage and liability issues may not be severed,"' and even though an
error in admitting medical testimony"' or in determining the amount recoverable under an insurance policy"' does not affect the liability issues,
the error affecting damages requires a complete new trial. It is respectfully
submitted that this rule is an unnecessary and extravagant waste of
precious judicial time in these days of overcrowded dockets.
A surprising number of appeals are dismissed upon a finding that the
judgment below is interlocutory rather than final. In State v. Gibson's
Distributing Co."' the trial court held that the Texas "blue law"'' was
unconstitutional in a hearing on a temporary injunction. The supreme
court held this to be an interlocutory decree, subject to shorter appellate
time limits, because the permanent injunction had not been ruled upon.
The ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute logically disposed of
both the temporary and permanent injunctions, but form rather than
substance dictated treatment of the judgment as interlocutory.
Severance may not be accomplished by implication, and an appeal is
premature in the absence of an express severance when fewer than all of
the parties are disposed of even though all of the issues between the parties
to the appeal may have been disposed of." A severance is not accomplished
by the mere use of separate trials under rule 174,"' and an order reflecting
an end of one separate phase of such litigation is interlocutory."'
With questionable logic, a court of civil appeals held that two separate
orders which disposed of all of the parties and the subject matter, when
taken together, were nevertheless interlocutory."' The court incorrectly
distinguished the rule in McEwen v. Harrison,' which involved virtually
the same situation, by noting that in McEwen one order granted relief
and the other non-suited another party, while in the case before the court
each of the two orders was a take nothing judgment upon the merits.
148431 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1968).

149435 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1968).
15Key v. W.T. Grant Co., 439 S;W.2d 902-(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
"' I1ey v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958).
"'Goodrich v. Tinker, 437 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
'Pacific Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 434 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1968).
154436 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. 1968).
..
s T-x. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 286a (1967), which prohibits the sale of merchandise on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays.
156
Mayfair Bldg. Corp. v. Oak Forest Bank, 441 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
17TEx. R.

Csv. P.

174.

158McKellar v. Bracewell, 437 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref.
"'Thomas v. Shult, 436 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
100 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961).
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The supreme court refused the application for writ of error from an
opinion holding that an order striking a petition in intervention is interlocutory.' Although such an order is final as far as the potential intervenor is concerned, he must wait for the other parties to dispose of the
case at their own pace before appellate review may be had upon the
propriety of the attempted intervention.
In the situation where one of several parties dies before judgment, and
is not mentioned in the judgment, one court of civil appeals held that
disposition by implication of the claim involving the deceased party depends upon whether or not the record reflects that the trial court was aware
of the death.' If the death does not appear of record, the judgment is not
appealable, while if that fact is in the record, the judgment impliedly disposes of all matters and is appealable.
The fact that an order granting a new trial is interlocutory and nonappealable may not be circumvented by substituting the remedy of mandamus.' "
The supreme court has held that in order to complain of jury misconduct, all of the evidence during the trial must be a part of the appellate
record, because the appellate courts must determine whether it was the
alleged jury misconduct rather than a deficiency in the evidence which
caused the verdict.' A juror's affidavit upon the issue of misconduct, unsupported by a record of the testimony at the hearing on the motion for
a new trial, does not support a claim of jury misconduct.'
In order to contend that the trial court erroneously prevented a proper
jury argument, the record must contain a complete statement of facts and
a bill of exceptions setting out the proffered argument."'
The 1967 addition to rule 372".. attempts to liberalize the formalities
of bill of exception practice by providing that anything occurring in open
court or in chambers which is reported and certified by the court reporter
may be included in the statement of facts. However, unless the trial judge
signs the statement of facts, objections to the charge are not preserved.'
Texas litigants are frequently the victims of unnecessary waiver of the
right of appellate complaint, caused by their attorney's general rather
than specific objections in motions and briefs. Although a court of civil
appeals might hold that a defective point of error will be considered if
the underlying argument clears up the defect,"' a court of civil appeals is at
least as likely to hold the point was waived.' The failure to observe preBryant v. Barnes, 433 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), error ref.
"'Bogle v. Lee, 43S S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
"6sBrown v. American Finance Co., 432 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error
ref. nmr.e;,
e"'Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1969).
" Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Read, 433 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Wac
1968), error ref. n.r.e.
16 7 Wood v. State, 434 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968).
1 TEx. R. Civ. P. 372(1).
""State v. Turboff, 431 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
""McClure v. City of Texarkana, 435 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968), error
dismissed.
10 Weingarten, Inc. v. Moore, 441 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error granted
(point too general which complained of the submission of special issues "over the timely and proper
161

1970]

TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE

scribed time limits is also a prolific source of lost appellate rights. An important civil appeals decision171 recognizes the careless but frequent practice
of reciting the date of trial rather than the later date of signing in the first
line of a judgment. In recognition of that practice, bolstered by a nunc
pro tunc correction of a date, the court did not dismiss the appeal. The
common, but incorrect, form of judgment recites, "On this the 13th day
of March, 1968, came the parties," etc. It would be better to recite: "On
the 13th day of March the case came on to be heard," etc. The latter correctly states the date the trial began but does not incorrectly imply that

the judgment was signed on that date.
The supreme court has rendered an important decision defining the distinction between judicial errors and clerical errors for the purpose of determining whether a judgment may be corrected nunc pro tunc. In Finlay
v. Jones"2 the supreme court held that erroneous recitations of proper
service of process and of facts indicating the ripeness for default judgment, were judicial rather than clerical errors. Even though the origin of
the errors could be traced to the clerk's misfiling of papers, the court had
the judicial duty to determine whether there was proper in personam
jurisdiction. Thus, the initial clerical error ultimately became a judicial
error, making the nunc pro tunc order invalid and a subsequent order purporting to grant a new trial void.
Nunc pro tunc corrections are not available to re-enter orders for the
purpose of extending appellate time limits."' The entry of an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial after it has already been overruled by operation of law may not be used as a device for enlarging appellate time limits.17
A request for a transcript was held to be timely, authorizing an extension of filing time, despite the fact that the appellant failed to explain why
he waited ten days after filing his appeal bond to order the transcript."1
Another liberal case holds that a delay of forty-six days after the entry of
judgment in ordering a statement of facts still permitted a finding of good
cause for delay in filing. The court reporter was willing to sign an affidavit
that if he had not been ill and busy with other work, he could have completed the statement of facts within the sixty-day period."" However, a
delay in ordering a statement of facts until two days before the expiration
of the sixty-day period was held to be fatal. 7 A delay in the preparation
of the statement of facts is not good cause for failing timely to file the
objection of the defendant" without stating what that objection was); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v.
Sheffield, 439 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e. (point too general
saying trial court erred in not submitting special issues in the form requested by appellant); Sainz
v. Nance Buick Co., 431 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1968) (failure to specify why
court
57t erred in withdrawing case from jury).
Jackson v. Gish, 440 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
172435 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex. 1969).
'"Brown v. Vander Stucken, 435 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968); Texas
State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Blankfield, 433 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968),
error ref. ns.r.e.
174Lucas v. Windham, 439 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).

"lNovosad v. Clary, 431 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error granted.
'"eCarmichael v. Carmichael, 432 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968).
17
Reinhardt v. Martinez, 439 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
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transcript."h Neither is misplaced faith that a case will be settled an excuse
for failure to file the appellant's brief on time.'"
In Dunn v. Dunn' the supreme court held that the oral pronouncement
of a judgment followed by the death of a party before the written judgment was signed was nonetheless a valid final judgment. No docket entry
had been made reflecting the judgment. Although the date of the
written judgment controls for appellate time limits purposes, it is the
oral pronouncement which fixes the rights of the parties and the entry
of a written judgment is merely a ministerial act. The court did not discuss intriguing hypothetical variations of the facts such as what would be
the result if the court mailed letters to counsel informing them of his decision and one of the parties died before mailing or before receipt of the
letters. Delay in signing an order extends the time during which the court
has power to set the order aside because that time period begins to run upon
the signing of the written order.181 The trial court may rule upon an undisposed of motion for judgment n.o.v. even during the time between the
entry of judgment and the time the judgment becomes final."
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular
jury finding, an appellate court may only consider the statement of facts,

and may not consider the jury's findings upon other issues." A court of
civil appeals has held that successfully to attack a negative jury answer to

an issue upon which the dissatisfied party has the burden of proof, there
must be a showing that the negative answer is without factual support."
In other words, such a point is unmeritorious unless the undisputed facts
require a positive answer. In that event, there would be no need to submit

the issue at all. The holding effectively denies an attack on a negative jury
finding upon an issue on which the dissatisfied party has the burden of

proof.
In cases where attorney's fees are recoverable, it is proper for a trial
court to make a factual determination of an additional amount of attorney's
fees to be recovered in the event the judgment is affirmed on appeal.'
However, it is improper to approach the matter backwards, initially awarding the larger fee and subjecting it to remittitur in the event there is no
appeal.'

Declaratory Judgments. The intended remedial benefits from a liberal
construction of the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act8 7 are not
being realized because Texas courts broadly construe the constitutional
178Classy v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968).
...Pena v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 441 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
180439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969).
8Maddox
'
v. Schwartz, 439 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
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Machac v. Hajek, 437 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
3
"' Bourbon v. Glover, 431 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968).
.84Smith v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 433 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
" Grimes v. Robitaille, 288 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956), error ref. n.r.e.
186 Security Life Ins. Co. v. Executive Car Leasing Co., 433 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.'

Texarkana 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
87
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § 12 (1965).
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prohibitions against judicially rendered "advisory opinions." In Firemen's
Insurance Co. v. Burch"' the supreme court departed from the majority
rule in the United States with its holding that declaratory relief is not
available to determine the duty of a casualty insurer to pay a judgment
against its insured in threatened or pending litigation. Declaratory judgment is available to determine the duty to defend, but the duty to defend
is not always co-extensive with the separate obligation to pay a judgment. The court held that the duty to pay a judgment is hypothetical
and "iffy" in view of the fact that the insured might not win the case.
As a practical matter, this holding is a serious setback to the determination of insurance coverage questions. A court of civil appeals has followed in the footsteps of Firemen's. In avoiding a ruling upon the application of a Sunday closing law, the court held that the store operator
had failed to show justiciable controversy in the absence of threatened
prosecution for the admitted failure to comply with the closing law.'" '
Miscellaneous. The failure, over proper objection, to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the interests of a minor in a change of name, an adoption proceeding, or a custody case may or may not be reversibly erroneous.
In Newman v. King"' the supreme court held that the failure to appoint
a guardian ad litem in a change of name proceeding would not be reviewed
in the absence of an objection in the trial court because the alleged error
did not adversely affect the public, and therefore did not constitute fundamental error. That holding has been followed in a child custody case."'
The minor's court appointed guardian ad litem has real rather than perfunctory powers. It is not error, indeed it seems entirely proper, to allow
the guardian ad litem to participate fully in the trial, and even to tax his
fee against the unsuccessful defendant."' In the settlement of a claim
involving a minor plaintiff, it is error, in the absence of good cause, for the
court to tax the guardian ad litem fee against the minor's share of the
award.'"
If a juror's bias in the form of prejudgment of the facts is developed on
voir dire examination, the juror is disqualified as a matter of law, and the
complaining party need not also show that probable harm resulted to him."4
Disqualification of a judge whose wife was a first cousin of a party was
not waived when asserted as a motion for mistrial.1" The jury's consideration of attorney's fees in a condemnation case was held to show probable
harm as a matter of law." This misconduct should not occur if the court
1"5442 S.W.2d 331

(Tex. 1969).

" State v. Margolis, 439 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
1090433 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1968).
"' Huber v. Buder, 434 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
1"'Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Locker, 436 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

1969).
"' Siepert v. Brewer, 433 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1968), error ref. n.r.e.
1"State v. Burke, 434 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968).
"'5 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. White, 439 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1969).
""Central Power & Light Co. v. Freeman, 431 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi
1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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reads the mandatory admonition to the jury as required by rule 226a.1 97
Arithmetical calculations by a juror, based on the evidence, do not constitute jury misconduct. "
In Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood'" the supreme court again categorized
"curable" and "incurable" jury arguments, holding that an
objection is a
necessary prerequisite to complaint of "curable" arguments, but is not
required to challenge an "incurable" argument. These rules place counsel
for the victim of erroneous argument squarely upon the horns of a dilemma
as to whether or not to object. Protection of the record dictates making the
objection; but trial strategy may dictate otherwise as shown by an argument made in an 1851 Georgia case: "For what practitioner has not regretted his untoward interference, when the counsel thus interrupted, resumes, 'yes, gentlemen, I have touched a tender spot, the galled jade will
wince; you see where the shoe pinches.' "'
The argument that this is the plaintiff's "last day in court" is not improper.
Improper but curable arguments are that the plaintiff should be paid
workmen's compensation in a lump sum before the insurance company
went broke;' that the most the workmen's compensation claimant could
recover was $35 per week for 360 weeks;20 and reference to primary and
contributory negligence issues as "ours" and "theirs. '
A clerical error in recording the jury's unanimous answer to a special
issue is a ground for a new trial, but if one juror claims that he intended
the answer, the trial court may choose to believe him and may then properly
deny a new trial.'

9T

1 TEx. R. Cirv. P. 226a.
9
1 McIlroy v. Wagley, 437 S.W.2d
109436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).

5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969), error ref. n.r.e.

"' Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851), quoted in Tanner v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 438
S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"'1Johnston Testers v. Rangel, 435 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969),
error ref. n.r.e.
2"'Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cantu, 438 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error
ref. n.r.e.
...Travelers Ins. Co. v. Walston, 436 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
204
Switzer v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
205Stone v. Moore, 442 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.

